The Trump administration seems to be heading toward a tariff future that will result in different tariff levels for different nations. If achieved and maintained, in the long run, this will result in shifts of origin for imported products toward those countries that end up with lower tariff levels.

In the near term, this trend is already underway regarding imports from China. It seems reasonable to assume, given the escalating trade and political tensions between China and the US, that most, if not all, importers for China are scrambling for alternative sources. These changes will have differing impacts depending on which US coast is involved.

I used S&P Global PIERS data to try and gauge the impact of the China freeze-out. Of the loaded TEUs arriving in the US in 2024, over 41% originated in mainland China. Therefore, a dramatic slowdown in these volumes is very significant.

Meanwhile, shipments from other origins such as other Asian nations are surging, given the 90-day reprieve that has been granted by President Donald Trump. Importers will try to crowd as much of this freight through the keyhole as they can. Approximately 32% of 2024 import TEUs came in from other Asian nations, including India. The surge in traffic from these origins will help cushion the blow from the China slowdown, but only to a limited effect.

The US West Coast (USWC) will feel these changes more acutely than the East or Gulf coasts. Over 57% of the USWC import TEUs in 2024 arrived from China, while they composed “only” 25% of the East Coast’s volume, with the Gulf Coast in between at 35%.

There is another way to look at the situation, which is to divvy up the US import volume originating in each global region by coast of arrival. This can help us gauge the potential impact of such shifts in origin. Once again, we’ll use PIERS data to provide the picture. However, as we look at these numbers, keep in mind that in 2024, USWC share was artificially boosted by cargo diversions away from the East Coast due to labor unrest. Therefore, some share loss will be inevitable even without changes in origin shipping points.

In 2024, unsurprisingly, the USWC was the dominant recipient of China-originating cargo, accounting for 65% of the 2024 TEUs, followed by the East Coast at 27% and the Gulf Coast at 8%. It is reasonable to expect that some of the China volume will move to new originations in Southeast Asia. USWC share of Southeast Asia originations was 55% in 2024, 10 points lower than China. In other words, for every 100 TEUs of China-originating freight that migrates to, say, Vietnam, the USWC loses 10 inbound TEUs, the USGC loses six, and the USEC gains 16.

The situation is even more extreme if the origin migrates to India. The USEC received 86% of the 2024 TEUs originating on the Indian subcontinent.

Because the USWC share is higher for China-originating freight than any other region, even including the other nations of Northeast Asia (i.e. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea), literally any move away from China can be expected to negatively affect the USWC’s share of inbound cargo.

What this potentially means for the USWC is that those ports are staring down what might be a triple-barreled threat:

1、Overall lower trade volumes due to the trade war

2、Loss of share as imports that were diverted in 2024 due to both the East Coast labor uncertainty and the Red Sea/Suez Canal closure start to return to their previous East/Gulf coast routings

3、Additional loss of share due to migration of imports away from China toward other origin regions that are less favorable to the USWC

In other words, when it comes to US ports, the trade war will result in winners and losers. Or perhaps more accurately, bigger losers and smaller losers.